. Officially, the Ch'orti' Maya did not exist.
1 A decade later, a Ch'orti' movement, with thousands of members, was at the centre of national indigenous protests against the Honduran state. 2 The movement has since been granted thousands of acres of land purchased by the state and are awaiting more. How could indigeneity be so volatile, and have any legal foundation? A social construction approach (Barth 1969) would not regard ethnic volatility as enigmatic at all because ethnic groups are not transhistorical nations or ''peoples,'' but people with common interests who inflate or create cultural particularities to build internal cohesion and boundaries with competing groups. This approach seems vindicated in the recent history of indigenous rights movements. Before its international consolidation in the early 1990s, determining who was indigenous was not a problem because the status held few benefits (Plant 2002:214) . ''indians'' were synonymous with archaism and torpor, and were treated at best as children and beasts of burden, and at worst as vermin. Those who clung to an indigenous lifestyle and identity did so both despite and because of discrimination. International recognition of indigenous rights in the International Labour Organization's (ILO 1989) Convention Q3 169, the counter-celebration of the Colombian quincentennary in 1990-1992, the 1993 UN International Year of the World's Indigenous People, two subsequent UN Decades of Indigenous Peoples, and the overlapping of the environmental movement, did much to reverse the polarity of indigenous value. With indigenous rights arose immediate disputes over who and what is indigenous. Many groups, including ones with clear African descent, came ''out of the closet'' as indigenous, claiming that they had hidden their indigenous identities due to discrimination (e.g., Kuper 2003; Lazzari 2003; Hooker 2005; Forster and Chomsky 2006; Anderson 2007) . In Bolivia, Evo Morales reclaimed an indigenous heritage to successfully campaign for the presidency. In fact, indigenous peoples are proliferating, not because life chances are improving, but because more are strategically reclaiming indigeneity for pragmatic reasons (see Perz, Warren, and Kennedy 2008 on the situation in Brazil), yet those most need of remuneration and attention can become lost in the crowd (Canessa 2007) . Conversely, some argue that states such as Mexico and El Salvador have created more inclusive definitions of indigenous Q4 to manage potentially unruly, impoverished populations (Hale 2005 (Hale , 2006b Speed 2005; Martínez Novo 2006; Tilley 2006) . A strict social construction (i.e., deconstruction) approach, while a radical advance from the primordialist notion of transhistorical ''nations'' and ''peoples,'' can easily subvert the legitimacy of all indigenous claimants or lead to an untenable laissez-faire perspective that accepts anyone claiming to be indigenous as such (cf. Kuper 2003; Hale 2005 Hale , 2006a Graham 2006) . 3 Refusal to seriously address the issue of indigenous foundations, even while applying the term 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39 selectively with subconscious criteria, can have repercussions not only for struggles between indigenous claimants and governing bodies, but among the claimants themselves (cf. Canessa 2007 on Bolivia) . Attention to social construction should be balanced by close examination of the demographic and cultural continuities and discontinuities. When criteria for identifying indigeneity are elaborated in academic publications and the policies of international bodies, they are remarkably similar. In fact, international bodies consult academics as well as indigenous peoples, state representatives, and others to establish concepts of indigenous. The concepts used by the UN (Cobo 1986/87) , ILO (2003) , World Bank (2001) , EU IDB (2006:5) share: (1) descent from colonized populations; (2) ongoing attachment to a territory considered ancestral; (3) self-identification as a distinct people; and (4) traditions distinct from those of the dominant national populations (cf. Plant 2002:214; Warren and Jackson 2002:13; Niezen 2003:19, 23; Canessa 2007) . When ''traditions Q5 '' are specified (Plant 2002:214; Tilley 2006) , features include everything that ''modern'', individualistic, capitalist consumers presumably do not have: selfsubsistent and sustainable economies rooted in holistic spiritual traditions, distinct languages and dress, autochthonous political and legal systems, and communitarian ethics. Niezen (2002:23 , my emphasis) puts Q5 his finger on the inherent contradiction of such expectations: ''(w)hat indigenous share is some form of subsistence economy, a territory or homeland, a spiritual system predating the arrival of missionaries, and a distinctive language. Most importantly, they share the destruction and loss of these things.'' Indigenous peoples must claim some continuity while emphasizing the disruption of being colonized, oppressed, and cheated (Casaú s Arzú 2000; Cojtí Cuxil 2000; Tilley 2006:12-13, 16-17, 50-53; Canessa 2007) . This is why, as Niezen (2003:19) points out, ''(i)n others' attempts to define indigenous, the ambiguity is ''the most significant feature''.'' The ILO Convention 169 (ILO 2003) leaves the door open when it states that indigenous peoples are ''regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws and regulations,'' and ''retain some or all of their social, economic, cultural and political institutions'' (my emphasis). The EU's (1998) Human Rights and Democratization Policy states that ''many or all'' of the above conditions are expected, while the World Bank (2001) requires ''the presence, in varying degrees, of some'' of these characteristics. It should come as no surprise that after 25 years of negotiations of the UN's (2007) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), the myriad negotiators were unable to agree on a common definition, providing the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand a reasonable excuse to oppose it (Banks 2006).
The Honduran Ch'orti'case highlights this contradiction but also makes clear that reasonable criteria must be established. Honduran governments, landlords, and Ch'orti' claimants have indigeneity and called in anthropologists for consultation. What will become clear via the Ch'orti' case is that a) indigeneity must be analyzed in regional historical contexts, b) continuity of culture and a proud, open identity should not be expected, and c) evaluation is as much about the unmarked category mestizo as it is about indigenous. El Salvador. 4 Thereafter, the ethnic make-up of the region became murky, despite the existence of the clear legal category of ''indian.'' The indian town of Copán (see Fig. 1 , below) ceased to exist in official records in the 1600s (Fuentes and Guzmán 1699:210), a condition that continued throughout the 1700s (Feldman 2009), but the peones on tobacco and cattle haciendas in the valley were probably of Ch'orti' descent (Martínez 1980) . According to some contemporary Copán Ch'orti's, their ancestors began immigrating as independent farmers from Guatemala and the nearby Honduran town-1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 Figure 1 Ch'orti'map near here. From then on, Ch'orti' speakers from Guatemala continued to immigrate due to population pressure, a catastrophic drought in 1914-15 (Fought 1969:474; Metz 2006:146) , 7 and political repression from the 1930s to 1980s.
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A countervailing process was the abandonment of Ch'orti' identity. In the late 19th century, Honduras' governing elites began to see indians as an anachronism and hindrance to development, such that by the 1880s ''indians'' disappeared from official records (Herranz 1998:53-54) . Long occupied titled and untitled Indian lands were privatized, and mestizos and whites (criollos) began displacing or absorbing them as peones on their new estates. In San Andrés Ocotepeque in 1875, only a decade after its indian communal brotherhood (cofradía) had received the title for about 28 km, 2 the land was privatized, taxed, and eventually sold by the indians, whose descendents claim they were duped and desperate to sell due to the tax burden and a famine. The Ocotepeque indians also fought to have the mayor and schoolteachers remain indians, but the state rejected this on the grounds that in Honduras ethnicity is not recognized (Herranz 1998:53-4) . In the Copán area, large landowners like the notorious Guerra and Cuevas families started titling Ch'orti'-occupied lands for cattle and tobacco operations in 1921, which accelerated in 1934 after the resolution of a border dispute with Guatemala (see Loker 2005) .
9
For most of the twentieth century the national academy eliminated any reference to racial and ethnic diversity to promote de-segregation and the postcolonial myth of mestizaje (Euraque 2004:12, 33-34) . In line with Latin American indigenismo, the elites deprecated the existent indigenous cultures but glorified the nation's indigenous past. In a 1926 xenophobic reaction to the influx of Caribbean black and Middle Eastern immigrants, elites renamed the national currency Lempira, after the legendary Lenca chief who valiantly resisted the Spanish invasion (Euraque 2004:66, 264) . Inspired by the international infatuation with all things Maya in the 1920s and 30s, they claimed to be the political descendents of the ancient Maya, despite the fact that the Mayas occupied only the far western edge of the country and abandoned their cities over a half a millennium before the Spanish arrived (Euraque 2004:45, 50; Maca 2009 ). For the living indigenous peoples, however, only in 1962 did the state finally enact the Agrarian Reform Law, recognizing that they have usufruct rights to untitled lands and waterways (González 1998:69 
JLCA 1087
of Anthropology and History (IHAH) into an agency for both promoting mestizaje and recovering ancestral traditions.
Throughout most of the twentieth century the campesinos (subsistence farmers) of Copán and Ocotepeque were so land poor that they were forced to work for inadequate amounts of food on the haciendas. Malnutrition, digestive infections, and respiratory illnesses were rampant, and the hacienda owners demanded so much time and paid so little money that agricultural rituals were abandoned (see Schumann de Baudez 1983) . The rituals also clashed with worldviews propagated by Catholic and Protestant missions and the public school system. Local elites regarded them as inferior ''indians'' and the army categorically treated all Guatemalan Ch'orti' political refugees as tacamiches, or guerrillas, from 1960 to 90. In the 1960s, 10 Honduran campesinos began to fight against the lack of land, environmental degradation, high illiteracy, lack of medical care, high infant mortality, and lack of infrastructure (Schumann de Baudez 1983; Rivas 1993:220-30 Martínez Perdomo 1997:20) . This continued into the early 1990s when Copán campesinos followed the non-ethnic, class-based approach of the underground National Rural Workers Union (CNTC), but with little success.
13
The ostensible support for indigeneity from the World Bank and the UN helped tilt Honduran politics in favor of multiculturalism in the politically repressive 1980s. Indigenous movements aided by the Catholic Church, NGOs, and anthropologists rose inversely with the decline of leftist, labor, student, and campesino organizations (Barahona and Rivas 1998:83-84, 96) . The 1987 SECPLAN SeminarWorkshop redefined the problems of poverty and marginalization as indigenous ones. Although Ch'orti's were not invited to the seminar, much academic attention was directed to whether Ch'orti's could be said to exist. In 1977 -79, Schumann de Baudez (1983 ) led a team of IHAH ethnographers to study Copán farming practices. She did not classify the destitute campesinos as indigenous because nearly all had abandoned the language and distinctive dress, although she noted that many were of Guatemalan Ch'orti' ancestry and derogatorily called ''indians. '' 14 In 1984, another IHAH team (Ardó n Mejía and Sánchez 1984) collected oral narratives from Copán residents, some of whom they referred to as ''indians,'' but they wrote of Ch'orti'customs mostly in the past tense. A reversal came in 1987 when ethnographic teams from the National Pedagogical University (UPN, later UPNFM) and the Honduran National University (UNAH) concluded 
that the Copán campesinos were Ch'orti's who practiced the ''totality of Ch'orti'-Maya culture'' in regard to spirituality and customary law (Martínez Perdomo 1997:7) . They argued strongly that what makes someone indigenous is not language but ethnic consciousness and the will to recover one's cultural heritage (Martínez Perdomo 1997: iii-v, 7-8, 12; Mena Cabezas and Flores Mejía 2007:25, 28, 29) . Correspondingly, in 1988, the Honduran Advisory Council for the Development of Autochthonous Ethnic Groups listed 2,000 Ch'orti's in Copán and Ocotepeque (CAHDEA 1988:17, 24) . Nevertheless, when anthropologist Ramó n Rivas (1993:47, 212 fn 30) surveyed Honduras indigenous cultures and conditions for the World Bank 4 years later, he classified 3,500 Copán and Ocotepeque campesinos as having ''Ch'orti' traditions.'' The obvious population in Ocotepeque was so mestizo such that he did not bother to research them in detail. I visited Copán Ruinas in 1990 but was told by campesinos that there were no Ch'orti's there, meaning no Ch'orti' speakers. Some campesinos later confessed to me that in the 1980s their ethnic consciousness was so weakened that they were condescending towards Guatemalan Ch'orti' ''indian'' refugees. The seeds of ethnic revitalization began to sprout in 1988. In the Copán community of Choncó , 45 families invaded 56 hectares of hacienda land they had lost after the 1934 border settlement with Guatemala. The landowners threatened them with death and the army beat them. Ten families who held out were imprisoned in 1990, but in the ensuing court proceedings between INA and the landowners, the campesinos' claim that the land was indigenous won them 42 of the disputed hectares. Pivotal was the name of their village, choncó, conceivably a Ch'orti' phrase meaning ''snake stream'' (chan kojn), and the reference to the river as chichipolote was probably derived from Nahuatl.
Nationally, the indigenous movement began to fly the nest from its state incubators. Representatives appropriated government forums to establish the bases for an independent movement: the recovery and title of ancestral lands; support for their languages and traditional forms of organization; control over their natural resources; and representation in Congress (Anderson 2007:393-394) . Thus, while the state was accepting international investments for indigenous and eco-tourism, including support for the multinational Ruta Maya (Mayan Trail) project, it found itself increasingly pressured by unruly indigenous organizations (Euraque 2004:255-7; Mortensen 2009 ). In the first state-backed federation of indigenous peoples, CAHDEA (Honduran Advisory Council for the Development of Autochthonous Ethnic Groups), indigenous representatives shared leadership with sympathetic mestizo officials, but in 1992 they created the independent Confederation of Autochthonous Peoples of Honduras (CONPAH; Anderson 2007:394). Ironically, it was the ethnically rejuvenated Lencas, whom anthropologist Chapman (1992:13) Rivas 1998:100, 103; Anderson 2007:396) . Church leaders, NGOs, and students joined the singing and praying marchers, and urbanites, including the press and even the Chamber of Commerce, warmly received the nation's re-emergent indians (Barahona and Rivas 1998:116, 121 ). On May 10, 1994, President Reina, recently elected on a pro-civil society (vs. military) platform, signed the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 on indigenous rights (González 1998:73) and established the Institute of Autochthonous and Popular Cultures within the Ministry of Culture (Euraque 2004:250) .
Nevertheless, just 2 months later COPIN was back to protest against the deaths and disappearances of its members and to demand health, education, communications, and protection for land and natural resources (González 1998:74; Euraque 2004:11; Anderson 2007:396) . Having thus escaped the bounds of ''the permissible Indian'' (Hale 2005) , their authenticity was challenged by President Reina, who claimed that the true indians were vanquished in the conquest and the protestors were culturally no different than Tegucigalpa's slum dwellers. COPIN, buoyed by popular support, persisted, and Reina made more concessions (Barahona and Rivas 1998:118-19; Euraque 2004:72) . Nonetheless, the army secretly tried to create a new indigenous federation to divide the movement. On 4 April 1995, 1,500 CONPAH marchers descended again on the capital, and once again Reina refused to meet them. They responded with a hunger strike, winning them still more concessions (Barahona and Rivas 1998:124-5) . By 1996, the Reina government, perhaps resigned that the problem would not go away, signed the ''Declaration of Tegucigalpa,'' which created the National Commission of Ethnic Groups to coordinate state and private agencies in meeting indigenous demands (González 1998:78; Euraque 2004:254) .
The campesinos in the Ch'orti'region were excluded until anthropologist Lázaro Flores of UPNFM, his students, and COPIN leaders set out to organize them as indigenous Ch'orti's in November 1994. Six Copán campesinos formed the Major Commission of the Ch'orti'Indigenous National Council of Honduras (CONICHH), 15 and 2 years later Ocotepeque campesinos formed the Minor Commission to recover lands once titled to its San Andrés brotherhood. Recruitment was initially disheartening because the leaders were inexperienced, landlords threatened assassinations, and campesinos were insulted at the suggestion that they were ''indians.'' Some called the leaders ''the antichrist'' for promoting the recovery of Ch'orti'rituals. In 1995 Copán landlords and other members of the Chamber of Commerce formed a vigilante group that trailed the leaders and shot at their houses at night, while the police refused to let them meet in town. Nevertheless, the leaders' sacrifices, support from EU-funded NGOs and the Catholic Church, and the   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38 39 40 on April 12, 1997 (Fig. 2) . The assassination backfired. Defying police intimidation, 1,000 enraged campesinos converged on Copán Ruins for Amador's funeral, while townspeople cowered behind locked doors. They then marched on Tegucigalpa, 365 kilometers (226 miles) over mountainous terrain, and were joined by Lencas, Tawahkas, Pech, Miskito, Toliman, Garífuna, and various officials from NGOs and the Catholic Church. Three thousand marchers demanded an investigation into Amador's death 16 and compliance with ILO 169. Ignored by the Reina administration, they occupied government offices for 45 days with provisions from UPNFM students. During this time, member Ovidio Pérez was assassinated in Copán, and the protesters demanded an investigation into his death as well. Army commandos finally dragged them out of the buildings, but the government signed an agreement promising 2,000 hectares to the Ocotepeque community within 2 months and 5,000 more at a later date, and 500 immediately to the Copán community and 1500 more later. First, however, it insisted on conducting an anthropological 1998:85-6) (Fig. 3) . Government compliance in purchasing land for Ch'orti's was slow, and CONPAH, on behalf of the Ch'orti's, organized yet another March of Hunger in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 Figure 3 Ocotepeque Organizers, near here. Once again the government delayed, and in 1998 the Ch'orti's occupied the archeological park and the major highway entering Ocotepeque, where the police shot eight men, killing one, and imprisoning 93. This prompted the Ocotepeque's president to buy guns, which in turn led to his ousting and the founding of a splinter organization directly controlled by CONPAH. 19 By August 2000, the government had ceded only about 10 percent of the land promised and none of the park profits, so the Ch'orti's retook the park. This time the Chamber of Commerce, the police, and the army surrounded them, launched tear gas from an army helicopter, and clubbed the fleeing Ch'orti's. Two hundred Ch'orti's of all ages were injured, 15 were admitted to hospital, and one woman aborted due to the tear gas. As Amador had earlier instructed, they filmed the attack, but the attackers confiscated their cameras and broke a reporter's leg. INA (2001:22) records for 1998-2001 show the state spent $2,424,562 (L36,368,435) purchasing 1,716 hectares for Ch'orti's in the Departments of Santa Rosa de Copán and OcotepequeFa little over 1 percent of the 146,443 hectares titled for the nation's indigenous as a whole. According to INA representatives, the delay has been due to the high prices requested by local landowners, who almost overnight went from enemies to allies of the movement, as they extracted inflated prices from the state for land that had plummeted in value after the collapse of the tobacco market (Loker 2005:323) . Some landlords invited Ch'orti's onto lands even before the state purchased them, but after state delays, threatened to evict them again. Exacerbating the process was the growth of CONIMCHH to 68 communities in six townships, 20 which demanded 20,000 hectares. 
for agency if done from a primordialist perspective, but it is one important tool among many for indigenous claimants. For the indigenous it is more help than hindrance to have legal foundations for their claims, because more often than not, they do not have the public and international support to sway the state with intimidation. For desperately poor and marginal people, protests are severe sacrifices in time, money, and personal security, which is why CONIMCHH only turned to them when it felt the state was not negotiating in good faith. How, though, can indigeneity be established when the concept subsumes disruptive colonization and evidence of continuity with pre-colonial populations, when in Latin America such evidence must be cultural and strictly biological because of generalized miscegenation? Those most deserving of remuneration have also been those on whom this has had the most severe impact. One must look at the particular details of each group in regional historical contexts (Watanabe and Fischer 2004:23-24) , as opposed to having universal criteria or essentialist expectations. A growing number of scholars have recently tried balancing a social construction approach with attention to social history and traditions. Essentially, their point is that the social construction of ethnic boundaries does not occur in a historical and cultural vacuum, but pre-existing traditions are used to understand and accentuate ethic differences. For example, Cepek (2008) challenges the notion that indigenous performances for outsiders are necessarily inauthentic. The Cofáns' use of environmentalist concepts like ''violating the earth'' and ''biodiversity'' have certainly been borrowed, but they are not insincere because the Cofán have long considered themselves as caretakers of the environment. Contact with foreigners, in fact, has brought this long held value to the fore as a source of positive identity construction. Similarly, Ariel de Vidas (2008:161) sees traditions not simply as products of ethnic competition, but also as motivators for boundary construction between two populations with opposing value systems. For her, Teenek identity in Mexico is the product of defense against aggressive mestizos, but also a reaffirmation of their unique, longstanding cosmological principles promoting humility, withdrawal, and dialog over confrontation. In a less direct way, Kray (2007) , while discussing the dilemmas faced by Yucatec Maya women in the new economy of tourism and maquiladoras, identifies ''Mayas'' as people who distinguish themselves from mestizos and white tourists by their self-control over greed and sex. These traditional values both pre-date and have been accentuated by contact with outsiders.
Have the Honduran Ch'orti' seen themselves and been treated as a ''people apart''? The Ch'orti' are distinct from the national population in some ways. The anthropologists and officials assigned to adjudicate Ch'orti' indigeneity in the 1980s and 90s used all and any distinctions, such as indigenous place names or the presence of just a few speakers, to confirm separate identity. With such standards, Ch'orti'claimants have a lot of cultural ammunition. All practice some regional Mesoamerican traditions, such as using Ch'orti' origin words such as ixchoko for child 25 and kume for youngest sibling, 26 following the phases of the moon for its effects on plants and pregnancies, recounting stories of the siguanaba water monster that disguises itself as an attractive person, observing omens about the sight of snakes and butterflies, recognizing the Black Christ of Esquipulas as the patron of the region, practicing at least some subsistence corn and beans agriculture, and following region-specific recipes for herbal remedies and foods, like ticucu tamales and toasted corn and cocoa drinks such as chilate and tiste. All strongly identify with their local landscapes and collect wild edibles, and some places are imbued with historical and sacred meaning. In Ocotepeque, the Marchala River has been known to form a giant snake that floods towns; caves and mountain peaks, like one named ''Martín Cayahuanca,'' provided tamales to the ancestors; and the ruins of old towns, like San Sebastian, 27 Azacualpa, and Antigua
Ocotepeque remind people what happens when God is not respected. The Copán Ch'orti's argue that their ancestors built the ruins of Copán, from which tunnels lead to regional caves (cf. Maca 2009). The rural communities of Copán Ruinas reproduce the most culturally distinctive traditions, which involve spiritual practices linked to corn and beans agriculture (Rivas 1993; Martínez Perdomo 1997:7-8, 26; Mena Cabezas and Flores Mejía 2007:28-32) . As in the most distinctive communities in Guatemala (Ló pez García and Metz 2002; Ló pez García 2003; Metz 2006) , in a few Copán communities native priests (padrinos) make sacrificial payments to the rain and earth (padrineos) 28 and lead prayers to bless seeds, animals, and family. The most important ceremony is the tzikin (Ch. tzik'in), when ancestors return to partake of the spiritual essence of a feast prepared by their descendents. In the community of Tapesco, a Guatemalan Ch'orti' ''Mesiah'', Guillermo García, founded a cult replete with its own temple, guards porting magical wooden guns, rigid rejection of official politics and organized religion, and Mesoamerican cosmology regarding the four pillars of the universe, including prophesies of Armageddon for all who stray from traditional subsistence lifestyles. 29 Some Hondurans regard such customs as exotic or bien raro, and development workers express frustration at their subsistence mentality. Also unlike the general Honduran population, some Copán Ch'orti's prefer their own hand-made crafts or those made by Guatemalan Ch'orti's, such as pottery, grass mats, rope, hammocks, fiber bags, and palm brooms, over industrially produced plastic ones that are sometimes cheaper. All follow the tradition of paying laborers with meals as well as money, including meat at planting (from the sacrifice of fowl). Nevertheless, in regard to values, far from rejecting materialism, all demand modern education, health care, and infrastructural development from the state. To the north and east of Copán Ruinas are communities whose loss of land has severely restricted, and in many cases led to the elimination of, subsistence agriculture, craft production, and spiritual traditions. Most work as low wage laborers on coffee and cattle plantations (cf. Rivas 1993:327), but desire to regain the subsistence lifestyle minus the spirituality. As one man in Porvenir II, Copán, explained, ''in these modern times we believe in nothing, but before the people were very intelligent. They had plenty of beans and corn because they had faith, but now that faith has ended. We've tried to recover it, but we just couldn't.'' Another, from Agua Caliente, Copán, echoed this: ''the people before knew how to live, because whatever they divined was true. And one sees in books that they were right. They were guided by stars, trees, and their own intelligence. But here all was lost y because we moved ahead by education. After all, the old-timers were ignorant and isolated.'' Many maintain the subsistence value of having as many children as God grants, which is a motivating factor for the movement's struggle for land (Martínez Perdomo 1997:78, 84, 90; cf. Metz 2001a cf. Metz , 2006 , and a rare few with enough resources in Santa Rita practice the tzikin. Poorer households follow the Mesoamerican tradition of making a stove by resting a ceramic griddle (comal) on three stones. As for identity, most regard themselves first and foremost as poor campesinos who have been cheated out of their land; participation in national development, and the idea of being indigenous, has only been embraced by a fraction of them. Both Copán Ch'orti's and non-indigenous locals, in fact, question their indigeneity. Some with European phenotypes may never have had ancestors with indigenous identities and traditions, but many others have clear indigenous features.
The Ocotepeque claimants are obviously different from the other Ch'orti' claimants as well as Guatemalan Ch'orti's. No one remembers when Ch'orti' was spoken there, and the men regard carrying loads in the traditional Mesoamerican headstrap (mecapal) style (akukuch) to be ''Indian'' and embarrassing. Many members do not have land to practice subsistence agriculture, and some would not know how to do so if they did have the space. Those who farm tend to do so for the market. The annual round of agricultural rituals and craft-making practiced in Guatemala and the Copán core are unknown, 30 although they use the word tzikin to refer to the candied squash given to children on All Saints Day and the Spanish word caseano for the celebration of the dead, which they do not practice. On the other hand, they maintain unique traditions seemingly based on Old World practices, most of which pertain to the San Andres and San Sebastian brotherhoods. Every October and November, the San Andrés brotherhood, tenaciously remaining in the old municipal seat (Antigua) destroyed by a 1934 landslide, weaves together the surrounding communities with its ritual ''Migration'', in which the saint's image is passed from community to community, house-to-house, and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38 
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honored with prayers and feasting. The journey ends with ''The Entrance'' to Antigua on November 17 and involves fireworks, performances by masked Oldtimers, ''indians,'' Scarecrows (corasquines), the ujiganga image (of probable Lenca linguistic origin), and the Dance of the Moors and Christians. Traditionally, The Entrance is a time of drunken revelry, but the Catholic Church has been trying to ban such ''pagan'' practices. The festivities end with the parales in the rural community of AzacualpaFonce the colonial municipal seatFwhere fruit is hung in deference to the fertility-bearing San Andrés.
31 While in many respects the Ocotepeque Ch'orti's are culturally indistinguishable from the national campesino population, locally they regard themselves as a people apart in their devotion to their brotherhoods and to the recovery of their privatized land.
Discussion
The Honduran Ch'orti' case raises many questions. Should people who speak no indigenous languages and wear no distinctive dress be considered indigenous? If so, how much distinctive culture and how strong an ethnic consciousness must they have? What if people practice distinctive traditions, but those traditions have few or no indigenous roots? Should people who essentially attempted to pass as mestizos and even ridiculed ''indians'' be recognized as indigenous when ethnically repressive conditions are replaced with more benign ones (Martínez Perdomo 1997:22; Lazzari 2003; Rappaport 2005) ? Is it possible for an indigenous people to have a shameful identity instead of a proud, righteous one? Do people cease being indigenous when they become corrupt and materialistic? It is convenient for academics to purport that they are not the judges of such issues, only observers and analysts of how these issues are played out on the ground, but the mere application of terms like indigenous, Maya, mestizo, and campesino to some people and not others is an inherently evaluative and political act. Thus, these questions cannot be dodged. Keeping in mind the need to recognize that indigenous peoples have some verifiable historical linkage, such as descent or distinctive traditions, from colonized populations that suffered deleterious cultural and biological disruptions, some of the questions above become manageable. Colonized people should not be expected to maintain their language and distinctive dress if they expose them to discrimination. Similarly, regarding the degree of cultural difference necessary for indigenous status, it is not the quantity, extent, or depth of the cultural differences that matter, but whether those cultural differences are used to reinforce an identity as a separate people. We cannot expect indigenous people to continue (or to have ever practiced, for that matter) sustainable, self-subsistent economies or preserve a consensus-based political and legal system. It may seem disingenuous when selfproclaimed Ch'orti's no longer believe in animate environs, prefer biomedicines   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 3 0 4 over herbal ones, and want maquiladora jobs, but not when they have lost their land, been attacked for their spiritual practices, taught only in Spanish, and employed at starvation wages. The existence of such traditions can clearly mark indigeneity, but non-indigenous roots of distinctive cultural practices should not disqualify people from indigeneity status. What matters is that they practice some culture exclusive to themselves that helps define and bolster their identity, and that they have some evidence linking them to colonized populations. The Copán Ch'orti's continue to suffer racial and cultural discrimination, and those to the north and in Ocotepeque suffer mostly from the effects of discrimination against their ancestors. The Ch'orti'claimants to the north and east of Copán are more ambiguous, however. Their principal identity has been as landless campesinos, and they, like most CONIMCHH members, regard membership alone as an affirmation of indigenous status. When asked whether a community or individual is Ch'ortí, they bluntly respond, ''yes, they are members'', or ''no, they're not members.'' The government, moreover, cedes land not to communities or households, but directly to CONIMCHH for redistribution, and this despite the fact that ''Indians'' in the region (Fry 1988:174) have long preferred to manage their land individually, not communally (Jackson 2002:102-3; Montejo 2002:126-7; Horton 2006; Loker 2009 ). While the privileging of a political organization over a comprehensive indigenous group would seem damning, membership in and of itself implies significant sacrifices of time, money, and potentially life and limb, so that all members can recover land and repressed Ch'orti'traditions, and build a stronger sense of solidarity. Maya leader Montejo (2002:129) eloquently expresses the sense of emphasizing a strong identity over returning to a primordial culture: ''(T)he agenda of Mayan scholars and activists is not to embellish ourselves with a romantic past or to wrap ourselves in ancient Maya garb but to revitalize our Mayan identity and weave back in the sections worn away by centuries of neglect. Contemporary Maya are constantly creating and recreating their Maya culture and redefining themselves. '' This raises the issues of shameful identities and returning to indigenous identities after having rejected them. Neither should disqualify people who by definition have suffered predatory discrimination, which would be tantamount to blaming the victim precisely when some redress was finally available. This is where the issue of mestizos comes to the fore. For centuries indians have passed as mestizos for self-preservation or upward mobility, and now some mestizos or unmarked campesinos are embracing their indigenous sides (e.g., Ló pez García 1998; Grey Postero and Zamosc 2004:12, 14; Hoffman French 2004; Canessa 2006; Gabbert 2006:89, 91) , just as some scholars have Q8 long urged them to do (e.g., Guzmán-Bockler 1975) . Mestizos by definition have mixed indigenous and European heritage, and can suffer racial discrimination from whites. Gasco (2006) 
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for example, found in Soconusco, Mexico, that, as in Ocotepeque, the colonial emergence of a ladino/mestizo identity coincided with indigenous loss of land and inability to pay tribute, but today they share the same poverty and many traditions with the indigenous, such as knowing the Nahua names and uses of over 200 medicinal plants (cf. Kufer et al. on ladinos in the Guatemalan Ch'orti' area). While mestizos becoming indigenous may result in a welcome boost in indigenous numbers and power, it can also erode indigenous legitimacy and divert attention from the people who need it most (Canessa 2006) . If such mestizos can demonstrate the deleterious consequences of racial discrimination and maintenance of a distinct identity, then they should be remunerated for past wrongs and protected from future ones. As some anthropologists and the Colombian state have recognized, there are many degrees of indigeneity, each with their own particular needs and degrees of urgency (Friedman 1994:97-100; Maybury-Lewis 1997:x, 8; Plant 2002:212) .
The last question addressed here regards whether groups that are corrupt, materialistic, and environmentally unsustainable should be considered indigenous. Lauer (2006) presents such a case in Venezuela's Biosphere Reserve. There, most indigenous Yanomamo and Ye'kwana have sided with environmental and religious NGOs to protect their land from developers, but one Ye'kwana political leader has used his government position to accumulate wealth by allying with extractive industries. This latter group argues that they refuse to be kept in a forested museum and deserve the same amenities as others, suggesting that the anti-development faction is beholden to foreign NGOs and thus not indigenous. The Honduran Ch'orti's have found themselves in similar predicaments. Some leaders have used organization funds in corrupt and unauthorized ways, and some communities are only interested in land and not in Ch'orti'indigenous values of communalism, recovery of local forests, and language revitalization. These values, however, have largely been promoted by anthropologists, NGOs, and leaders from other indigenous groups. Nevertheless, like the Cofán (Cepek 2008) , the Ch'orti's have long practiced communalism in the form of reciprocity and consensus decision-making, and have shared a concern for wild resources that they use for subsistence living. In this sense, in disputes between ''the corrupt materialists'' and ''the communitarian environmentalists,'' one should err towards the latter as the best indigenous representatives, depending on the historical context of each group.
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